Freagra Samourai Wallet ar Rialacha Beartaithe FinCEN Le haghaidh Bitcoin Meascadh

By Bitcoin Iris - 3 mhí ó shin - Am Léitheoireachta: 20 nóiméad
Dé Céadaoin, 24 Eanáir, 2024 5:00 PM

Freagra Samourai Wallet ar Rialacha Beartaithe FinCEN Le haghaidh Bitcoin Meascadh

Ar an 23 Deireadh Fómhair, 2023 chuireamar ceist ar ár n-aturnae, Rafael Yakobi de Na Dlíodóirí Crypto to assemble an expert legal team to respond to the U.S. Department of the Treasury and FinCEN’s proposed rules that would seriously harm your privacy by effectively outlawing bitcoin mixing as well as conflating basic best practices such as not reusing addresses as a suspicious action requiring enhanced reporting.

Anseo thíos tá atáirgeadh cruinn den litir a chuireamar faoi bhráid an Chisteáin agus FinCEN mar chuid den tréimhse iarratais phoiblí ar thuairimí.

Ba mhaith linn buíochas a ghabháil Rafael Yakobi agus an fhoireann a chuir sé le chéile chun an freagra seo a dhréachtú thar ceann Samourai agus ár n-úsáideoirí: Carla Reyes, Sasha Hodder, JW Verret, i measc daoine eile a d’oibrigh go díograiseach taobh thiar de na cásanna ar feadh míonna ag ullmhú na haighneachta seo mar go gcreideann siad go gcaithfí aghaidh a thabhairt ar an ró-sheasamh díobhálach seo ag an rialtas feidearálach.

Ba mhaith linn buíochas ó chroí a ghabháil Deich31, a gheall go dúthrachtach cabhrú le cuid de na costais shuntasacha a thabhaigh muid chun an freagra seo a dhréachtú.

Lastly, we would like to thank all 25 of the unaffiliated Bitcoin companies that read and signed this letter to FinCEN in agreement with our position. They are listed individually at the bottom of this page.

Is féidir leat PDF den litir thíos a íoslódáil:

Alt 311 Ainmniú Idirbhearta Measctha NPRM Litir Tráchta PDF

Andrea Gacki 22 Eanáir, 2024
Stiúrthóir
Líonra um Fhorfheidhmiú Coireanna Airgeadais
Roinn Státchiste na SA
Bosca 39
Vín, VA 22183

TÁ ISTEACH LEICTREONACH

Maidir le: Uimhir Duillín FENCEN–2023–0016 – Togra de Bheart Speisialta Maidir le Meascadh Airgeadra Fíorúil In-chomhshóite mar Aicme Idirbheart is Bunús Sciúradh Airgid

A Stiúrthóir Gacki:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on Docket Number FINCEN-2023-0016 (the "Mixing Transaction NPRM"), released by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") on October 22, 2023.[1] Is cuideachtaí éagsúla neamhchleamhnaithe muid a bhíonn ag brath ar chosaintí tábhachtacha cibearshlándála agus ar bhogearraí a chumasaíonn príobháideacht chun ár ngnólachtaí agus ár n-úsáideoirí a chosaint. Chuirfeadh fairsinge na rialacha atá molta ag an NPRM Idirbheart Measctha an iomarca ualach ar ár n-úsáid teicneolaíochtaí den sórt sin ar bhealaí nach gcuideodh le FinCEN a shainordú a bhaint amach maidir le sciúradh airgid agus úsáid aindleathach eile airgid a chosc. Mar thoradh air sin, scríobhaimid chun ár n-imní tromchúiseacha a chur in iúl maidir le úrnuacht agus scóip na mBeartas Speisialta Beartaithe agus na sainmhínithe neamhleor atá iontu.[2]

The Proposed Special Measures would unreasonably infringe upon the legitimate financial privacy interests of cryptocurrency users, and would apply to a variety of digital techniques that are not mixing transactions at all, but rather simply represent good cybersecurity practices. Moreover, the Proposed Special Measures are unnecessary to achieve FinCEN's aim, and we encourage FinCEN to either withdraw the Mixing Transaction NPRM altogether or to pursue a less invasive, less restrictive, and more effective approach—the same approach it has used since its first enforcement activities in the cryptocurrency space in 2013—to enforcement against specific bad actors.

1. Ba cheart do FinCEN a bheith cúramach agus an NPRM Idirbhirt Measctha a tharraingt siar go hiomlán nó go cúng mar dá nglacfaí leis, ní hamháin gurb ionann an Idirbheart Measctha NPRM agus an chéad uair a d’úsáid FinCEN a chumhachtaí Alt 311 i gcoinne aicme idirbheart, ach an chéad uair freisin FinCEN. ar chuir Beart Speisialta 1 i bhfeidhm riamh.

Historically, FinCEN has exercised caution in making designations under Section 311 and implementing Special Measures. Section 311 (31 U.S.C. 5318A), authorizes the U.S. Department of Treasury ("Treasury") to designate a foreign jurisdiction, financial institution, class of transactions, or type of account as being of "primary money laundering concern" and impose one or more of five possible "special measures." Treasury delegated that authority to FinCEN, which has used its power quite sparingly since Section 311's enactment. The first Section 311 action instituted by FinCEN in the virtual currency space occurred in 2013, when FinCEN instituted special measures against Liberty Reserve. Prior to that time, between 2002 and 2013, FinCEN had only ever implemented special measures against just four jurisdictions and 13 financial institutions. After a protracted legal battle regarding a Section 311 action between 2015-2017, FinCEN seemed reluctant to use its Section 311 powers widely. [3] Cruthú na Rannóige Imscrúduithe Domhanda (GID) in 2019 [4] and the enactment of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, which increased FinCEN's authority "to prohibit or impose conditions upon certain transmittals of funds (to be defined by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency," [5] coincided with an uptick in the use of Section 311 powers and a broadening of FinCEN's attention to all 5 available Special Measures.

Importantly, throughout its use of Section 311, FinCEN traditionally imposes Special Measure Number 5 to isolate a specific foreign financial institution and prevent it from accessing the U.S. financial system. Until this Mixing Transaction NPRM, FinCEN has only used Special Measure Number 1 one other time—in 2012 against JSC CredexBank ("Credex").[6] Tharraing FinCEN an riail bheartaithe sin siar níos déanaí in 2016. [7] Dá nglacfaí leis, is é an NPRM Idirbhirt Measctha an chéad uair a chuir FinCEN Beart Speisialta Uimhir 1 i bhfeidhm agus a Chumhachtaí Alt 311 á bhfeidhmiú aige. Ina theannta sin, is ionann an NPRM Idirbhirt Measctha seo agus an chéad uair riamh a rinne FinCEN iarracht aicme iomlán idirbheart a ainmniú mar phríomhchúram maidir le sciúradh airgid. Molaimid do FinCEN a bheith fíorchúramach le linn dó a chumhachtaí Alt 311 a fheidhmiú ar bhealach chomh nua-aimseartha—an chéad aicme idirbheart a ainmniú riamh agus Beart Speisialta 1 a chur i bhfeidhm den chéad uair riamh.

Exercising caution in Section 311 powers reflects the seriousness of Treasury's policy purposes for invoking its powers to make primary money laundering concern designations and impose special measures—namely, to act as a signal to the world that FinCEN is "serious about ensuring that the international financial system is safeguarded against the threat of money laundering." [8] As Treasury explained in the press release announcing the very first use of its Section 311 powers in 2002, when FinCEN uses Section 311, "[FinCEN] tell[s] the world clearly that these jurisdictions [or entities or transactions] are bad for business and that their financial controls cannot be trusted." [9] For the reasons further explained below, FinCEN's targeting of convertible virtual currency ("CVC") [10] purported "mixing" transactions does not achieve these aims. Rather than target transactions that are "bad for business," the Mixing Transaction NPRM targets an overly broad range of technical approaches used as best practices both by businesses and individuals for ensuring the security of CVC and impinges on privacy rights of legitimate users of CVC. In an attempt to exercise authority it has never used before (class of transactions) through a special measure it has never previously imposed successfully (special measure 1), FinCEN created a proposed rule fraught with misunderstandings and overreach. We urge FinCEN to withdraw the rule and reconsider its approach to this novel use of its authority.

2. The Mixing Transaction NPRM proposes a rule that is an improper and overbroad application of Section 311 measures to achieve transaction surveillance and suppression that FinCEN does not otherwise have a lawful basis to undertake.

Although the Mixing Transaction NPRM ostensibly designates a class of transactions as being of Primary Money Laundering Concern, its real goal is to uncover an alternative method for collecting information about and suppressing the use of digital currency in general. The Mixing Transaction NPRM is an improper and overbroad application of Section 311 measures for that purpose. Indeed, although the Mixing Transaction NPRM allegedly sanctions a class of transactions, it inconsistently throughout refers to "CVC mixers," "CVC mixing" and "CVC mixing services" by reference to specific business entities [11] agus mar chineál múnla gnó níos ginearálta.[12] Má tá cúis ag FinCEN a chreidiúint go seolann eintitis shonracha gníomhaíochtaí aindleathacha, d’fhéadfadh FinCEN na cumhachtaí Alt 311 a d’úsáid sé go traidisiúnta agus go rathúil a úsáid chun díriú ar eintitis shonracha mar institiúidí airgeadais is ábhar imní don sciúradh airgid príomha. Cuireann cur chuige den sórt sin bealach níos spriocdhírithe ar fáil chun aghaidh a thabhairt ar sciúradh airgid iarbhír agus ag an am céanna cosaint a thabhairt d’úsáideoirí dlisteanacha uirlisí dlisteanacha chun príobháideachas a fheabhsú.

Go háirithe, tá ceadú ag an gCiste ar leithligh an rud a dtagraíonn sé dó mar idirbhearta measctha CVC trína údarás ón Oifig um Rialú Sócmhainní Eachtrach (OFAC) chun daoine nó maoin a ainmniú a sheolann idirbhearta le dlínsí eachtracha sainithe arna sainaithint trí ordú feidhmiúcháin mar bhagairtí sceimhlitheoireachta. [13] Treasury is currently facing legal challenges to, and has been widely criticized for, its attempt to sanction the Tornado Cash open source software as property of a non-existent entity Treasury alleges is called "the Tornado Cash DAO entity." [14] Although we agree with the many arguments as to why Treasury's OFAC action with regard to Tornado Cash software is an example of agency overreach, we wish to make a different but related point here. To justify its OFAC sanctions against the Tornado Cash software, Treasury had to designate the software as property of an entity. [15] OFAC officially explained as part of defending its sanction to a judge that the Tornado Cash software was property under Treasury's regulations because it fell within the broad reach of "any contract whatsoever." [16] Although the definition of "transaction" under the BSA regulations is quite broad, it does not encompass "any contract whatsoever" but rather centers on monetary transfers and specific services offered by financial institutions, and provides a catch-all for "any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected." [17] Níl aon chuid den sainmhíniú is infheidhme maidir le meascadh CVC ina chonradh freisin.[18]

In other words, in proposing the Mixing Transaction NPRM, one arm of Treasury is classifying CVC mixing as a transaction type while another arm of Treasury argues that mixing is a contract for services. Under the regulations governing both enforcement actions, mixing activity cannot be both a transaction type and a contract for service simultaneously. Treasury's attempt to designate mixing software as both a type of transaction and a contract is evidence of the arbitrary and capricious nature of its attempt to regulate open-source software that enhances the digital privacy of legitimate CVC users. To the extent that FinCEN really wants to target non-custodial, open-source software that individuals can use on their own accounts, FinCEN exceeds its statutory authority.

Indeed, tools that enhance digital privacy in CVC transactions simply seek to enable a form of digital cash. As a result, in its rush to find a way to suppress CVC mixing transactions, by whichever means, even if inconsistent amongst different internal branches of its own agency, FinCEN's Mixing Transaction NPRM amounts to an attempt to sanction "all transactions conducted in cash," which is both impossible and an unreasonable over-extension of its rulemaking authority.

3. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn because the proposed definition of "CVC mixing" is overbroad and targets lawful activity in a way that makes the agency's proposed action arbitrary and capricious.

Setting aside FinCEN's own apparent confusion about whether CVC mixing is a transaction, a service, a business, or a specific business entity, when FinCEN does attempt to define the "class" of transactions that it considers to be CVC mixing, the Mixing Transaction NPRM's definition of "mixing" is extremely broad and includes numerous activities routinely conducted by legitimate users as a matter of routine safety precautions in online transacting in CVC. Specifically, the Mixing Transaction NPRM provides:

The term "CVC mixing" means the facilitation of CVC transactions in a manner that obfuscates the source, destination, or amount involved in one or more transactions, regardless of the type of protocol or service used, such as: (1) pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple persons, wallets, addresses or accounts; (2) using programmatic or algorithmic code to coordinate, manage, or manipulate the structure of a transaction; (3) splitting CVC for transmittal and transmitting the CVC through a series of independent transactions; (4) creating and using single-use wallets, addresses, or accounts, and sending CVC through such wallets, addresses, or accounts through a series of independent transactions; (5) exchanging between types of CVC or other digital assets; [19] nó (6) moilleanna arna dtionscnamh ag úsáideoirí ar ghníomhaíocht idirbheartaíochta a éascú. [20]

Go deimhin, meastar an chuid is mó de na gníomhaíochtaí a bhaineann leis an sainmhíniú atá beartaithe ar mheascadh CVC a bheith ina sárchleachtais bunaithe laistigh den tionscal maidir le húsáid agus le slánchoimeád CVC. Go sonrach, cuimsíonn an sainmhíniú atá beartaithe idirbhearta tintreach, sparán aonúsáide, babhtálacha adamhach, prótacail airgeadais díláraithe, gnéithe mona príobháideachta, agus sparán ilshínithe, i measc rudaí eile. Is é an rud is coitianta i measc an raon leathan uirlisí bogearraí seo ná go bhfeabhsaíonn siad príobháideacht dhigiteach agus go dtugann siad teicnící bunúsacha cibearshlándála d’úinéirí nó do choimeádaithe CVC. Tá úsáid na dteicnící seo chun sócmhainní digiteacha luachmhara a chosaint chomh gnáthamh agus chomh coitianta agus saor ó chuspóir aindleathach le húsáid fíordheimhnithe dhá fhachtóir chun sparán digiteach a fháil ina bhfuil faisnéis cárta íocaíochta nó cuntas X (Twitter roimhe seo) chun fógra neamhúdaraithe a chosc.[21]

4. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn because its inaccurate depiction of standard security practices as "mixing" impermissibly restricts the capacity of users to protect their property so that FinCEN can conduct a fishing expedition.

The proposed rule describes as red flags such everyday practices as "creating and using single address wallets" and "splitting CVC for transmittal." [22] The standard practice among cryptocurrency users is to change addresses with every transaction. For example, Coinbase Exchange describes to their users that: "[w]e automatically generate a new address for you after every transaction you make or when funds are moved between your wallet and our storage system. This is done to protect your privacy, so a third party cannot view all other transactions associated with your account simply by using a blockchain explorer." [23]

The fact that a small subset of users, who may be criminals, engage in the same operational security practices as ordinary users does not make those operational security practices suspect. The fact that criminals may use two-factor authentication to protect the security of their online applications does not mean that the use of two-factor authentication is itself an indicator or facilitator of criminal activity. In exactly the same way, the fact that users do not reuse Bitcoin addresses is merely indicative of basic operational security.

Mar aitheantas dealraitheach go gceadaíonn na huirlisí seo go dlisteanach réamhchúraimí tábhachtacha cibearshlándála, díolmhaíonn FinCEN institiúidí airgeadais ó thuairisciú ar aon cheann dá n-idirbhearta measctha féin a fhéadfaidh siad a dhéanamh le linn dóibh seirbhísí a sholáthar don phobal.[24] Trí institiúidí airgeadais a dhíolmhú ón riail, cruthaíonn FinCEN córas inar féidir le hinstitiúidí airgeadais bearta cibearshlándála cuí a ghlacadh chun CVC a úsáid, ach ní féidir le daoine rialta.

B'fhéidir níos mó fadhbanna fós, ar fud an NPRM Idirbheart Measctha, tugann FinCEN údar leis an riail atá beartaithe mar is gá chun cur ar chumas forghníomhaithe an dlí agus na gníomhaireachta tuiscint níos fearr a fháil ar na hidirbhearta agus ar an méid a tharlaíonn gníomhaíocht aindleathach trí mheascadh CVC. [25] The extraordinary and never before successfully invoked Section 311 power to designate a class of transactions and implement special measure 1 is not appropriate for use in a fact-finding mission. Employing such overly broad definitions as proposed in the Mixing Transaction NPRM for the purpose of authorizing an invasive fact-finding mission represents an arbitrary and capricious use of FinCEN's delegated rulemaking authority because FinCEN's justification for the rule lies outside of the statutory criteria for determining a class of transactions is of primary money laundering concern.

Specifically, FinCEN is statutorily required to consider the following factors when determining that a class of transactions is of primary money laundering concern: (1) the extent to which the class of transactions is used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction outside of the United States, including money laundering activity with connections to international terrorism, organized crime, and proliferation of WMDs and missiles; (2) the extent to which a class of transactions is used for legitimate business purposes; and (3) the extent to which action by FinCEN would guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes." [26] Ar fud an NPRM Idirbhirt Measctha, admhaíonn FinCEN, mar gheall ar easpa sonraí agus easpa tuisceana ar mheascóirí CVC, nach féidir leis measúnú leordhóthanach a dhéanamh ar a mhéid a chomhdhéanann meascadh CVC agus an riail atá beartaithe faoi aon cheann de na trí chritéar seo. [27] FinCEN's assessment ultimately boils down to: FinCEN does not have sufficient information to properly assess the statutory criteria required to justify the proposed rule, so the proposed rule is justified because, in FinCEN's own words, it "is necessary to better understand the illicit finance risk posed by CVC mixing." [28] Is é an sainmhíniú atá ar ghníomhaíocht rialála treallach agus capriseach úsáid a bhaint as smachtbhanna chun an fhaisnéis is gá a fháil chun an smachtbhanna a fhorchur fiú nuair a bhíonn a fhios ag an ngníomhaireacht gur dócha go gcuirfear ualach mór ar úsáidí dlisteanacha agus ar institiúidí airgeadais dá ndéanfaí amhlaidh.

5. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn or significantly narrowed in scope because FinCEN's required statutory analysis fails to adequately value the legitimate uses of CVC mixing services and unduly burdens legitimate users and financial institutions.

FinCEN admits that public blockchains "make it possible to know someone's entire financial history on the blockchain" [29] and that it "recognizes that there are legitimate reasons why responsible actors might want to conduct financial transactions in a secure and private manner given the amount of information available on public blockchains." [30] Yet, in the same document, alleges that the Mixing Transaction NPRM is necessary because CVC "is not without its risks and, in particular, the use of CVC to anonymize illicit activity undermines the legitimate and innovative uses of CVC." [31] Ní féidir leis an dá thairiscint seo a bheith cruinn go comhuaineach.

As a matter of technical reality, FinCEN's assertion that public blockchains expose a user's entire financial history on the blockchain to the public for everyone to see and inspect is correct. [32] Go deimhin, cruthaíonn sé sin an bunriachtanas atá ag úsáideoirí dlisteanacha CVC chun idirbhearta measctha CVC a dhéanamh — chun an leibhéal céanna príobháideachta airgeadais a thabhairt isteach arís agus a bhíonn acu sa chóras airgeadais traidisiúnta. [33] to their transactions via CVC (for example, the traditional financial system does not expose a consumer's entire credit card history to the public, and indeed, federal law requires that financial institutions protect such information from being exposed to the public [34]). [35]

Má áirithítear an leibhéal céanna príobháideachta ag a n-idirbhearta CVC agus a bhíonn idirbhearta in airgeadas traidisiúnta, laghdaítear an baol díobhála pearsanta d’úsáideoirí dlisteanacha agus cuireann sé ar chumas úsáideoirí dlisteanacha a gceart bunreachtúil chun príobháideachta a tharscaoileadh a sheachaint. Nuair a bhíonn aitheantas úsáideora dlisteanach CVC ar eolas agus ceangailte leis na sparán a bhfuil sócmhainní CVC acu, bíonn an t-úsáideoir ina sprioc le haghaidh fuadach, robáil, sracaireacht agus scéimeanna hacking. [36] Ina theannta sin, mar gheall ar an trédhearcacht dhúchasach seo ó thaobh dearadh na mbloc slabhraí poiblí, rialaigh an Cúigiú Ciorcad le déanaí nach raibh aon ionchas príobháideachta ann d'úsáideoirí blocshlabhraí poiblí gan chead nach ndéanann aon ghníomhaíocht bhreise chun príobháideacht a chosaint - a n-idirbhearta. [37] Úsáideann úsáideoirí dlisteanacha bogearraí a fheabhsaíonn príobháideachas agus iad ag déanamh idirbheartaíochta i CVC chun a gcearta príobháideachta atá faoi chosaint bunreachtúil a sheachaint de thaisme.

I ndeireadh na dála, theip ar FinCEN go hiomlán ina oibleagáid cuntas leordhóthanach a thabhairt ar an tionchar ar úsáideoirí dlisteanacha mar a éilíonn a údarás déanta rialacha. Agus é ag cosaint a rogha beart speisialta 1 thar 2 go 5, leagann FinCEN béim, gan mhíniú, go gceadaíonn beart speisialta 1—coimeád taifead breise — d’úsáideoirí dlisteanacha leanúint ar aghaidh ag baint úsáide as bogearraí a fheabhsaítear ar phríobháideachas gan bhriseadh. [38] This is false, as covered entities must report on any transaction that may have involved CVC mixing and a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, read broadly, it is possible that the rules proposed by the Mixing Transaction NPRM require reporting on transactions that involve CVC that were transacted through mixing software at any point in the asset's transaction history. Such reporting directly impedes the reasons for which legitimate users employ mixing software (to enhance financial privacy) by requiring the elimination of financial privacy (it is not a private transaction if an intermediary must surveil and report on the transaction). Software tools like mixers that enhance digital financial privacy provide a true electronic equivalent to cash. Notably, transactions in cash are not subject to rules such as those proposed in the Mixing Transaction NPRM. In an apparent acknowledgment of this deep and inherent conflict between the rules proposed by the Mixing Transaction NPRM and the legitimate uses to which legitimate users put CVC mixing software, FinCEN itself predicts that the rule will chill the use of CVC mixers.

6. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn because it requires covered financial institutions to perform law enforcement's function to accomplish FinCEN's AML goals, which FinCEN, DOJ, and law enforcement can achieve using existing tools when they have a proper legal basis to employ those tools.

Like the definitions of CVC mixing and CVC mixer, the Mixing Transaction NPRM's information reporting requirements demonstrate a deep lack of technological understanding. Notably, all of the transaction information that the Mixing Transaction NPRM proposes to include in required reports by covered financial institutions involves data that, in most circumstances, FinCEN can just as easily obtain itself through blockchain data analytics. Similarly, the customer information that FinCEN would require covered financial institutions to report includes the same kinds of information such institutions must already report if a transaction raises sufficient red flags to trigger the filing of a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR). Nevertheless, the Mixing Transaction NPRM seeks to require covered financial institutions to file such reports on every single transaction for which the CVC involved may have ever been transacted through the extremely broad set of software that FinCEN's proposed rule defines as CVC mixing software. In other words, because law enforcement investigations into activity involving CVC are sometimes more difficult, FinCEN seeks to impose broad surveillance of individuals without cause through covered financial institutions. Covered financial institutions should not have to become de facto oifigigh um fhorghníomhú an dlí chun imscrúduithe a dhéanamh níos éasca do FinCEN.

D'úsáid FinCEN, an Roinn Dlí agus Cirt, agus forghníomhú an dlí na huirlisí a iarrann FinCEN ar institiúidí airgeadais a úsáid chun comhlíonadh a thuairisciú faoin NPRM Idirbheart Measctha chun díriú ar ghníomhaithe aindleathacha sonracha. Tá sé léirithe ag FinCEN go bhfuil a fhios aige conas fiosrú agus forghníomhú ceart a dhéanamh i gcoinne soláthraithe seirbhíse meascáin CVC coimeádta sonracha nach bhfuil ag comhlíonadh na rialachán a bhfuil siad faoina réir. Trí dhíriú go sonrach ar ghníomhaithe aindleathacha a bhfuil cás soiléir, láidir tógtha ag FinCEN agus forghníomhú an dlí ag baint úsáide as na huirlisí anailísíochta sonraí blockchain atá ar fáil, déantar cothromaíocht níos fearr ar an ngá atá le meascadh aindleathach CVC a chomhrac agus úsáid dhlisteanach mheascadh CVC ag daoine aonair atá ag iarraidh a gcuid dlisteanach, bunreachtúil agus a chosaint. leasanna príobháideachais atá cosanta go reachtúil.

Ar na cúiseanna go léir a pléadh thuas, iarraimid ar FinCEN an NPRM Idirbheart Measctha a tharraingt siar go hiomlán.

Go raibh maith agat as do bhreithniú.

Má tá aon cheist agat nó má tá eolas breise uait, féach ar an eolas teagmhála thíos:

Rafael Yakobi, Esc.
Comhpháirtí Bainistíochta
Na Dlíodóirí Crypto, PLLC.
[ríomhphost faoi chosaint]
(619) 317-0722

Le meas,

Sparán Samourai, Deich31, Abhainn, stailc, RoninDojo, Eala Bitcoin, primal, GRÁID, Zaprite, Peach, Mempool Space, Sonraí in aghaidh srutha, Stakwork, Vida Global, voltage, Coincít, Sparán Mutiny, Caighdeán Bitcoin Company, Satoshi Energy, Cathedra Bitcoin, AnchorWatch, Bitnob, óshi, Battery Finance,Fill, Start9

This is a guest post by Samourai Wallet. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Iris.

Foinse bunaidh: Bitcoin Magazine