Samourai Wallet Rispons Għar-Regoli Proposti tal-FinCEN Għal Bitcoin Taħlit

By Bitcoin Magazine - 3 months ago - Ħin tal-Qari: 20 minuti
L-Erbgħa, 24 Jannar, 2024 5:00 PM

Samourai Wallet Rispons Għar-Regoli Proposti tal-FinCEN Għal Bitcoin Taħlit

Fit-23 ta’ Ottubru, 2023 staqsejna lill-avukat tagħna, Rafael Yakobi L-Avukati Crypto to assemble an expert legal team to respond to the U.S. Department of the Treasury and FinCEN’s proposed rules that would seriously harm your privacy by effectively outlawing bitcoin mixing as well as conflating basic best practices such as not reusing addresses as a suspicious action requiring enhanced reporting.

Hawn taħt hawn riproduzzjoni eżatta tal-ittra li ssottomettejna lit-Teżor u lill-FinCEN bħala parti mit-talba pubblika għal perjodu ta’ kummenti.

Nixtiequ nirringrazzjaw Rafael Yakobi u t-tim li laqqa' biex jabbozza din ir-risposta f'isem Samourai u l-utenti tagħna: Carla Reyes, Sasha Hodder, JW Verret, fost oħrajn li ħadmu b’diliġenza wara l-kwinti għal xhur sħaħ jippreparaw din is-sottomissjoni għax jemmnu li din il-qabża ta’ ħsara mill-gvern federali trid tiġi indirizzata.

Nixtiequ nirringrazzjaw mill-qalb Għaxar31, li b'grazzja wiegħed li jgħin biex ikopri xi wħud mill-ispejjeż konsiderevoli li ġarrbu biex nabbozza din ir-risposta.

Lastly, we would like to thank all 25 of the unaffiliated Bitcoin companies that read and signed this letter to FinCEN in agreement with our position. They are listed individually at the bottom of this page.

Tista' tniżżel PDF tal-ittra hawn taħt:

Taqsima 311 Ittra ta' Kumment tal-NPRM tat-Taħlit tat-Tranżazzjonijiet Nomina PDF

Andrea Gacki 22 ta’ Jannar 2024
Direttur
Netwerk ta 'Infurzar ta' Delitti Finanzjarji
Dipartiment tat-Teżor tal-Istati Uniti
PO Box 39
Vjenna, VA 22183

Ssottomessi ELETTRONIKAMENT

Re: Numru tad-Dott FINCEN–2023–0016 – Proposta ta’ Miżura Speċjali Rigward Taħlit ta’ Munita Virtwali Konvertibbli bħala Klassi ta’ Tranżazzjonijiet ta’ Tħassib Primarju ta’ Ħasil ​​ta’ Flus

Għażiż Direttur Gacki:

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on Docket Number FINCEN-2023-0016 (the "Mixing Transaction NPRM"), released by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") on October 22, 2023.[1] Aħna varjetà ta’ kumpaniji mhux affiljati li jiddependu fuq salvagwardji importanti taċ-ċibersigurtà u softwer li jippermetti l-privatezza biex jipproteġu n-negozji tagħna u l-utenti tagħna. Il-wisa' estrema tar-regoli proposti mit-Tranżazzjoni ta' Taħlit NPRM tkun ta' piż żejjed fuq l-użu tagħna ta' teknoloġiji bħal dawn b'modi li ma jgħinux lill-FinCEN biex tikseb il-mandat tagħha li tipprevjeni l-ħasil tal-flus u użu illeċitu ieħor tal-flus. Bħala riżultat, niktbu biex nesprimu t-tħassib serju tagħna dwar in-novità u l-ambitu tal-Miżuri Speċjali Proposti u d-definizzjonijiet inadegwati li jinsabu fihom.[2]

The Proposed Special Measures would unreasonably infringe upon the legitimate financial privacy interests of cryptocurrency users, and would apply to a variety of digital techniques that are not mixing transactions at all, but rather simply represent good cybersecurity practices. Moreover, the Proposed Special Measures are unnecessary to achieve FinCEN's aim, and we encourage FinCEN to either withdraw the Mixing Transaction NPRM altogether or to pursue a less invasive, less restrictive, and more effective approach—the same approach it has used since its first enforcement activities in the cryptocurrency space in 2013—to enforcement against specific bad actors.

1. Il-FinCEN għandha teżerċita kawtela u jew tirtira għal kollox jew b'mod dejjaq tfassal it-Tranżazzjoni ta' Taħlit NPRM għaliex jekk tiġi adottata, l-NPRM tat-Tranżazzjoni ta' Taħlit mhux biss tirrappreżenta l-ewwel darba li FinCEN uża s-setgħat tagħha tat-Taqsima 311 kontra klassi ta' tranżazzjonijiet, iżda wkoll l-ewwel darba li FinCEN qatt impona Miżura Speċjali 1.

Historically, FinCEN has exercised caution in making designations under Section 311 and implementing Special Measures. Section 311 (31 U.S.C. 5318A), authorizes the U.S. Department of Treasury ("Treasury") to designate a foreign jurisdiction, financial institution, class of transactions, or type of account as being of "primary money laundering concern" and impose one or more of five possible "special measures." Treasury delegated that authority to FinCEN, which has used its power quite sparingly since Section 311's enactment. The first Section 311 action instituted by FinCEN in the virtual currency space occurred in 2013, when FinCEN instituted special measures against Liberty Reserve. Prior to that time, between 2002 and 2013, FinCEN had only ever implemented special measures against just four jurisdictions and 13 financial institutions. After a protracted legal battle regarding a Section 311 action between 2015-2017, FinCEN seemed reluctant to use its Section 311 powers widely. [3] Il-ħolqien tad-Diviżjoni tal-Investigazzjonijiet Globali (GID) fl-2019 [4] and the enactment of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, which increased FinCEN's authority "to prohibit or impose conditions upon certain transmittals of funds (to be defined by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency," [5] coincided with an uptick in the use of Section 311 powers and a broadening of FinCEN's attention to all 5 available Special Measures.

Importantly, throughout its use of Section 311, FinCEN traditionally imposes Special Measure Number 5 to isolate a specific foreign financial institution and prevent it from accessing the U.S. financial system. Until this Mixing Transaction NPRM, FinCEN has only used Special Measure Number 1 one other time—in 2012 against JSC CredexBank ("Credex").[6] Il-FinCEN aktar tard irtirat dik ir-regola proposta fl-2016. [7] Jekk tiġi adottata, it-Tranżazzjoni ta' Taħlit NPRM tkun tikkostitwixxi l-ewwel darba li FinCEN imponiet Miżura Speċjali Numru 1 fl-eżerċizzju tas-Setgħat tagħha tat-Taqsima 311. Barra minn hekk, din it-Tranżazzjoni ta' Taħlit NPRM tirrappreżenta l-ewwel darba li FinCEN fittxet li tindika klassi sħiħa ta' tranżazzjonijiet bħala tħassib primarju dwar il-ħasil tal-flus. Inħeġġu lill-FinCEN biex teżerċita kawtela estrema fl-eżerċizzju tas-setgħat tagħha tat-Taqsima 311 b'tali mod ġdid—l-ewwel nomina ta' klassi ta' tranżazzjonijiet u l-ewwel impożizzjoni ta' Miżura Speċjali 1.

Exercising caution in Section 311 powers reflects the seriousness of Treasury's policy purposes for invoking its powers to make primary money laundering concern designations and impose special measures—namely, to act as a signal to the world that FinCEN is "serious about ensuring that the international financial system is safeguarded against the threat of money laundering." [8] As Treasury explained in the press release announcing the very first use of its Section 311 powers in 2002, when FinCEN uses Section 311, "[FinCEN] tell[s] the world clearly that these jurisdictions [or entities or transactions] are bad for business and that their financial controls cannot be trusted." [9] For the reasons further explained below, FinCEN's targeting of convertible virtual currency ("CVC") [10] purported "mixing" transactions does not achieve these aims. Rather than target transactions that are "bad for business," the Mixing Transaction NPRM targets an overly broad range of technical approaches used as best practices both by businesses and individuals for ensuring the security of CVC and impinges on privacy rights of legitimate users of CVC. In an attempt to exercise authority it has never used before (class of transactions) through a special measure it has never previously imposed successfully (special measure 1), FinCEN created a proposed rule fraught with misunderstandings and overreach. We urge FinCEN to withdraw the rule and reconsider its approach to this novel use of its authority.

2. The Mixing Transaction NPRM proposes a rule that is an improper and overbroad application of Section 311 measures to achieve transaction surveillance and suppression that FinCEN does not otherwise have a lawful basis to undertake.

Although the Mixing Transaction NPRM ostensibly designates a class of transactions as being of Primary Money Laundering Concern, its real goal is to uncover an alternative method for collecting information about and suppressing the use of digital currency in general. The Mixing Transaction NPRM is an improper and overbroad application of Section 311 measures for that purpose. Indeed, although the Mixing Transaction NPRM allegedly sanctions a class of transactions, it inconsistently throughout refers to "CVC mixers," "CVC mixing" and "CVC mixing services" by reference to specific business entities [11] u bħala tip ta' mudell ta' negozju b'mod aktar ġenerali.[12] Jekk il-FinCEN għandu raġuni biex jemmen li entitajiet speċifiċi jwettqu attivitajiet illeċiti, il-FinCEN jista' juża s-setgħat tat-Taqsima 311 li tradizzjonalment u b'suċċess użat biex jimmira entitajiet speċifiċi bħala istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji ta' tħassib primarju dwar il-ħasil tal-flus. Approċċ bħal dan joffri mod aktar immirat biex jiġi indirizzat il-ħasil tal-flus attwali filwaqt li jipproteġi l-utenti leġittimi ta’ għodod leġittimi li jtejbu l-privatezza.

Notevolment, it-Teżor ssanzjona b'mod separat dak li jirreferi għalih bħala tranżazzjonijiet ta' taħlit ta' CVC permezz tal-awtorità tiegħu tal-Uffiċċju tal-Kontroll tal-Assi Barranin (OFAC) biex jinnomina nies jew proprjetà li jwettqu tranżazzjonijiet ma' ġurisdizzjonijiet barranin speċifikament magħżula identifikati permezz ta' ordni eżekuttiva bħala li joħolqu theddid terroristiku. [13] Treasury is currently facing legal challenges to, and has been widely criticized for, its attempt to sanction the Tornado Cash open source software as property of a non-existent entity Treasury alleges is called "the Tornado Cash DAO entity." [14] Although we agree with the many arguments as to why Treasury's OFAC action with regard to Tornado Cash software is an example of agency overreach, we wish to make a different but related point here. To justify its OFAC sanctions against the Tornado Cash software, Treasury had to designate the software as property of an entity. [15] OFAC officially explained as part of defending its sanction to a judge that the Tornado Cash software was property under Treasury's regulations because it fell within the broad reach of "any contract whatsoever." [16] Although the definition of "transaction" under the BSA regulations is quite broad, it does not encompass "any contract whatsoever" but rather centers on monetary transfers and specific services offered by financial institutions, and provides a catch-all for "any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected." [17] L-ebda parti mid-definizzjoni applikabbli għat-taħlit ta' CVC ma hija wkoll kuntratt.[18]

In other words, in proposing the Mixing Transaction NPRM, one arm of Treasury is classifying CVC mixing as a transaction type while another arm of Treasury argues that mixing is a contract for services. Under the regulations governing both enforcement actions, mixing activity cannot be both a transaction type and a contract for service simultaneously. Treasury's attempt to designate mixing software as both a type of transaction and a contract is evidence of the arbitrary and capricious nature of its attempt to regulate open-source software that enhances the digital privacy of legitimate CVC users. To the extent that FinCEN really wants to target non-custodial, open-source software that individuals can use on their own accounts, FinCEN exceeds its statutory authority.

Indeed, tools that enhance digital privacy in CVC transactions simply seek to enable a form of digital cash. As a result, in its rush to find a way to suppress CVC mixing transactions, by whichever means, even if inconsistent amongst different internal branches of its own agency, FinCEN's Mixing Transaction NPRM amounts to an attempt to sanction "all transactions conducted in cash," which is both impossible and an unreasonable over-extension of its rulemaking authority.

3. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn because the proposed definition of "CVC mixing" is overbroad and targets lawful activity in a way that makes the agency's proposed action arbitrary and capricious.

Setting aside FinCEN's own apparent confusion about whether CVC mixing is a transaction, a service, a business, or a specific business entity, when FinCEN does attempt to define the "class" of transactions that it considers to be CVC mixing, the Mixing Transaction NPRM's definition of "mixing" is extremely broad and includes numerous activities routinely conducted by legitimate users as a matter of routine safety precautions in online transacting in CVC. Specifically, the Mixing Transaction NPRM provides:

The term "CVC mixing" means the facilitation of CVC transactions in a manner that obfuscates the source, destination, or amount involved in one or more transactions, regardless of the type of protocol or service used, such as: (1) pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple persons, wallets, addresses or accounts; (2) using programmatic or algorithmic code to coordinate, manage, or manipulate the structure of a transaction; (3) splitting CVC for transmittal and transmitting the CVC through a series of independent transactions; (4) creating and using single-use wallets, addresses, or accounts, and sending CVC through such wallets, addresses, or accounts through a series of independent transactions; (5) exchanging between types of CVC or other digital assets; [19] jew (6) tiffaċilita dewmien mibdi mill-utent fl-attività transazzjonali. [20]

Tabilħaqq, ħafna mill-attivitajiet maqbuda mid-definizzjoni proposta ta' taħlit ta' CVC huma kkunsidrati bħala l-aħjar prattiki stabbiliti fl-industrija għall-użu u ż-żamma tas-sigurtà tas-CVC. Speċifikament, id-definizzjoni proposta tinkludi tranżazzjonijiet sajjetti, kartieri li jintużaw darba, tpartit atomiku, protokolli finanzjarji deċentralizzati, karatteristiċi tal-muniti tal-privatezza, u kartieri b'ħafna firem, fost affarijiet oħra. Il-komunalità ewlenija fost din il-firxa wiesgħa ta’ għodod tas-softwer hija li jtejbu l-privatezza diġitali u joffru tekniki bażiċi ta’ sigurtà ċibernetika lis-sidien jew lill-kustodji ta’ CVC. L-użu ta’ dawn it-tekniki biex jissalvagwardja assi diġitali ta’ valur huwa rutina u ordinarju u ħieles minn skop illeċitu daqs l-użu ta’ awtentikazzjoni b’żewġ fatturi biex tiġi żgurata kartiera diġitali li jkun fiha informazzjoni dwar karta tal-ħlas jew kont X (li qabel kien Twitter) biex jipprevjeni tħabbira mhux awtorizzata.[21]

4. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn because its inaccurate depiction of standard security practices as "mixing" impermissibly restricts the capacity of users to protect their property so that FinCEN can conduct a fishing expedition.

The proposed rule describes as red flags such everyday practices as "creating and using single address wallets" and "splitting CVC for transmittal." [22] The standard practice among cryptocurrency users is to change addresses with every transaction. For example, Coinbase Exchange describes to their users that: "[w]e automatically generate a new address for you after every transaction you make or when funds are moved between your wallet and our storage system. This is done to protect your privacy, so a third party cannot view all other transactions associated with your account simply by using a blockchain explorer." [23]

The fact that a small subset of users, who may be criminals, engage in the same operational security practices as ordinary users does not make those operational security practices suspect. The fact that criminals may use two-factor authentication to protect the security of their online applications does not mean that the use of two-factor authentication is itself an indicator or facilitator of criminal activity. In exactly the same way, the fact that users do not reuse Bitcoin addresses is merely indicative of basic operational security.

F'rikonoxximent apparenti tal-fatt li dawn l-għodod jippermettu b'mod leġittimu prekawzjonijiet importanti taċ-ċibersigurtà, il-FinCEN teżenta lill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji milli jirrappurtaw dwar kwalunkwe tranżazzjoni ta' taħlit tagħhom stess li jistgħu jwettqu waqt li jipprovdu servizzi lill-pubbliku.[24] Billi teżenta lill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji mir-regola, il-FinCEN toħloq reġim fejn l-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji jistgħu jieħdu miżuri xierqa taċ-ċibersigurtà għall-użu tas-CVC, iżda n-nies regolari ma jistgħux.

Forsi saħansitra aktar problematiku, matul l-NPRM tat-Tranżazzjoni ta’ Taħlit, il-FinCEN jiġġustifika r-regola proposta bħala meħtieġa biex tippermetti lill-infurzar tal-liġi u lill-aġenzija jifhmu aħjar it-tranżazzjonijiet u l-punt sa fejn isseħħ attività illeċita permezz ta’ taħlit ta’ CVC. [25] The extraordinary and never before successfully invoked Section 311 power to designate a class of transactions and implement special measure 1 is not appropriate for use in a fact-finding mission. Employing such overly broad definitions as proposed in the Mixing Transaction NPRM for the purpose of authorizing an invasive fact-finding mission represents an arbitrary and capricious use of FinCEN's delegated rulemaking authority because FinCEN's justification for the rule lies outside of the statutory criteria for determining a class of transactions is of primary money laundering concern.

Specifically, FinCEN is statutorily required to consider the following factors when determining that a class of transactions is of primary money laundering concern: (1) the extent to which the class of transactions is used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction outside of the United States, including money laundering activity with connections to international terrorism, organized crime, and proliferation of WMDs and missiles; (2) the extent to which a class of transactions is used for legitimate business purposes; and (3) the extent to which action by FinCEN would guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes." [26] Matul l-NPRM tat-Tranżazzjoni ta’ Taħlit, il-FinCEN tirrikonoxxi li minħabba nuqqas ta’ dejta u nuqqas ta’ fehim tal-miksers CVC, ma tistax tivvaluta biżżejjed sa liema punt it-taħlit ta’ CVC u r-regola proposta jkejlu taħt kwalunkwe minn dawn it-tliet kriterji. [27] FinCEN's assessment ultimately boils down to: FinCEN does not have sufficient information to properly assess the statutory criteria required to justify the proposed rule, so the proposed rule is justified because, in FinCEN's own words, it "is necessary to better understand the illicit finance risk posed by CVC mixing." [28] L-użu ta’ sanzjoni biex tinkiseb l-informazzjoni meħtieġa biex tiġġustifika l-impożizzjoni tas-sanzjoni anke meta l-aġenzija tkun taf li jekk tagħmel hekk x’aktarx se timponi piż għoli fuq użi leġittimi u istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji hija d-definizzjoni ta’ azzjoni regolatorja arbitrarja u kapriċjuża.

5. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn or significantly narrowed in scope because FinCEN's required statutory analysis fails to adequately value the legitimate uses of CVC mixing services and unduly burdens legitimate users and financial institutions.

FinCEN admits that public blockchains "make it possible to know someone's entire financial history on the blockchain" [29] and that it "recognizes that there are legitimate reasons why responsible actors might want to conduct financial transactions in a secure and private manner given the amount of information available on public blockchains." [30] Yet, in the same document, alleges that the Mixing Transaction NPRM is necessary because CVC "is not without its risks and, in particular, the use of CVC to anonymize illicit activity undermines the legitimate and innovative uses of CVC." [31] Dawn iż-żewġ proposti ma jistgħux ikunu preċiżi fl-istess ħin.

As a matter of technical reality, FinCEN's assertion that public blockchains expose a user's entire financial history on the blockchain to the public for everyone to see and inspect is correct. [32] Tabilħaqq, dan joħloq il-ħtieġa fundamentali għal utenti leġittimi ta’ CVC biex iwettqu tranżazzjonijiet ta’ taħlit ta’ CVC—biex jerġgħu jintroduċu l-istess livell ta’ privatezza finanzjarja li jgawdu fis-sistema finanzjarja tradizzjonali. [33] to their transactions via CVC (for example, the traditional financial system does not expose a consumer's entire credit card history to the public, and indeed, federal law requires that financial institutions protect such information from being exposed to the public [34]). [35]

L-iżgurar li t-tranżazzjonijiet CVC tagħhom igawdu l-istess livell ta’ privatezza bħat-tranżazzjonijiet fil-finanzi tradizzjonali inaqqas il-periklu potenzjali ta’ ħsara personali lill-utenti leġittimi u jippermetti lill-utenti leġittimi jevitaw li jirrinunzjaw għad-dritt kostituzzjonali tagħhom għall-privatezza. Meta l-identità ta’ utent leġittimu ta’ CVC tkun magħrufa u konnessa mal-kartieri li jżommu l-assi CVC, l-utent isir mira għal skemi ta’ ħtif, serq, estorsjoni u hacking. [36] Barra minn hekk, minħabba din it-trasparenza inerenti permezz tad-disinn tal-blockchains pubbliċi, il-Ħames Ċirkwit reċentement iddeċieda li ma teżisti l-ebda aspettattiva ta 'privatezza għall-utenti ta' blockchains pubbliċi mingħajr permess li ma jieħdu l-ebda azzjoni addizzjonali biex jipproteġu l-privatezza tat-tranżazzjonijiet tagħhom. [37] Utenti leġittimi jimpjegaw softwer li jtejjeb il-privatezza meta jagħmlu tranżazzjonijiet f'CVC sabiex jevitaw li jirrinunzjaw involontarjament id-drittijiet tal-privatezza tagħhom protetti b'mod kostituzzjonali.

Fl-aħħar mill-aħħar, il-FinCEN naqset kompletament fl-obbligu tagħha li tagħti rendikont adegwat għall-impatt fuq l-utenti leġittimi kif meħtieġ mill-awtorità tagħha li tagħmel ir-regoli. Fid-difiża tal-għażla tagħha tal-miżura speċjali 1 fuq 2 sa 5, FinCEN tenfasizza, mingħajr spjegazzjoni, li l-miżura speċjali 1 — żamma ta’ rekords addizzjonali — tippermetti lill-utenti leġittimi jkomplu jużaw softwer li jtejjeb il-privatezza mingħajr interruzzjoni. [38] This is false, as covered entities must report on any transaction that may have involved CVC mixing and a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, read broadly, it is possible that the rules proposed by the Mixing Transaction NPRM require reporting on transactions that involve CVC that were transacted through mixing software at any point in the asset's transaction history. Such reporting directly impedes the reasons for which legitimate users employ mixing software (to enhance financial privacy) by requiring the elimination of financial privacy (it is not a private transaction if an intermediary must surveil and report on the transaction). Software tools like mixers that enhance digital financial privacy provide a true electronic equivalent to cash. Notably, transactions in cash are not subject to rules such as those proposed in the Mixing Transaction NPRM. In an apparent acknowledgment of this deep and inherent conflict between the rules proposed by the Mixing Transaction NPRM and the legitimate uses to which legitimate users put CVC mixing software, FinCEN itself predicts that the rule will chill the use of CVC mixers.

6. The Mixing Transaction NPRM should be withdrawn because it requires covered financial institutions to perform law enforcement's function to accomplish FinCEN's AML goals, which FinCEN, DOJ, and law enforcement can achieve using existing tools when they have a proper legal basis to employ those tools.

Like the definitions of CVC mixing and CVC mixer, the Mixing Transaction NPRM's information reporting requirements demonstrate a deep lack of technological understanding. Notably, all of the transaction information that the Mixing Transaction NPRM proposes to include in required reports by covered financial institutions involves data that, in most circumstances, FinCEN can just as easily obtain itself through blockchain data analytics. Similarly, the customer information that FinCEN would require covered financial institutions to report includes the same kinds of information such institutions must already report if a transaction raises sufficient red flags to trigger the filing of a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR). Nevertheless, the Mixing Transaction NPRM seeks to require covered financial institutions to file such reports on every single transaction for which the CVC involved may have ever been transacted through the extremely broad set of software that FinCEN's proposed rule defines as CVC mixing software. In other words, because law enforcement investigations into activity involving CVC are sometimes more difficult, FinCEN seeks to impose broad surveillance of individuals without cause through covered financial institutions. Covered financial institutions should not have to become de facto uffiċjali tal-infurzar tal-liġi biex jagħmlu l-investigazzjonijiet aktar faċli għall-FinCEN.

Il-FinCEN, id-Dipartiment tal-Ġustizzja, u l-infurzar tal-liġi preċedentement u b’suċċess użaw l-istess għodod li l-FinCEN titlob lill-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji biex jużaw biex jirrappurtaw il-konformità taħt it-Taħlit tat-Tranżazzjoni NPRM biex jimmiraw atturi illeċiti speċifiċi. Il-FinCEN wriet li taf kif tinvestiga u tinforza sew kontra fornituri ta' servizzi ta' taħlit ta' CVC ta' kustodja speċifiċi li mhumiex konformi mar-regolamenti li huma suġġetti għalihom. L-immirar speċifiku ta' atturi illeċiti li dwarhom il-FinCEN u l-infurzar tal-liġi bnew każ ċar u b'saħħtu bl-użu tal-għodod disponibbli tal-analiżi tad-dejta blockchain jibbilanċja aħjar il-ħtieġa li jiġi miġġieled it-taħlit illeċitu ta' CVC mal-użu leġittimu tat-taħlit ta' CVC minn individwi li jfittxu li jipproteġu tagħhom leġittimu, kostituzzjonali u kostituzzjonali. interessi tal-privatezza protetti legalment.

Għar-raġunijiet kollha diskussi hawn fuq, inħeġġu lill-FinCEN biex tirtira għal kollox it-Tranżazzjoni ta' Taħlit NPRM.

Grazzi għall-konsiderazzjoni tiegħek.

Jekk għandek xi mistoqsijiet jew tixtieq informazzjoni addizzjonali, jekk jogħġbok ara l-informazzjoni ta' kuntatt hawn taħt:

Rafael Yakobi, Esq.
Imsieħeb Maniġerjali
L-Avukati Crypto, PLLC.
[protett bl-email]
(619) 317-0722

Sinċerament,

Samourai Kartiera, Għaxar31, Xmara, Aqta, RoninDojo, Swan Bitcoin, Primal, GRIJDA, Zaprite, Ħawħ, Mempool Spazju, Dejta Upstream, Stakwork, Vida Global, vultaġġ, Coinkite, Kartiera tal-Ammutinament, standard Bitcoin kumpanija, Satoshi Energy, Katidra Bitcoin, AnchorWatch, Bitnob, Oshi, Battery Finance,Itwi, Bidu9

This is a guest post by Samourai Wallet. Opinions expressed are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.

Sors oriġinali: Bitcoin Magazine