By Bitcoin Tạp chí - 6 tháng trước - Thời gian đọc: 11 phút
Quyền riêng tư là nỗ lực của nhóm
Privacy is a complicated subject. It's not always a simple binary thing, private or not private, seen or unseen. Seen by whom? Private from whom? Private to what degree? If you are walking down the street with a mask on your face no one can see your face, so that means you are private, right? What if you are the only one wearing a mask? Are you private then? People might not be able to see your face, but they can see that you are the only one wearing a mask. If you travel around the same areas frequently, people might not know your face and name, but they can consistently recognize you in the same way people do a familiar face simply by noticing the only person who wears a mask is back again.
Vậy điều này có thực sự cấu thành sự riêng tư? Mọi người có thể không có khuôn mặt của bạn nên họ không thể nhận ra bạn nếu bạn tháo mặt nạ ra, họ có thể không xác định được danh tính hợp pháp của bạn do chưa bao giờ nhìn thấy mặt bạn, nhưng họ nhận ra bạn. Họ có thể nhận dạng bạn một cách nhất quán khi bạn có mặt với ý nghĩa biết rằng đó là cùng một cá nhân trong nhiều lần gặp bạn.
In order to achieve meaningful privacy, you would need a large percentage of the people wherever you are to also be wearing a mask. Only when you are not alone in using a mask does it actually provide meaningful privacy, otherwise it is just as distinguishing and identifiable a feature as your face is. But that's just the start.
Siêu dữ liệu và các mẫu hành vi
Ngay cả trong tình huống mọi người đều đeo mặt nạ, liệu tất cả họ có giống nhau không? Có bao nhiêu loại mặt nạ khác nhau? Có bao nhiêu người đang đeo mỗi loại mặt nạ? Nếu có ba loại mặt nạ mà mọi người đều đeo với tỷ lệ phân bổ gần như bằng nhau, thì sẽ có ba nhóm người hòa nhập với các thành viên khác trong nhóm chứ không phải các nhóm khác. Nếu ai đó đang đeo một chiếc mặt nạ hoàn toàn độc đáo mà không ai khác đeo, thì chúng ta sẽ quay lại hình vuông.
It goes even further, what clothes are you wearing? How tall are you? What color is your hair? How long is it? How much do you weigh? Are you muscular or non-muscular? Are you wearing boots, shoes, or sandals? All of these little things all of a sudden start making unique fingerprints people can use to identify you if everyone doesn't use the same thing. Wear the same shoes, same shirts, same hats, same masks. Some of these things, like your weight, your height, etc. cannot even be changed to conform exactly with everyone else. You might be able to lose a little weight, but someone who weighs 160 lbs and is 6 ft 2 isn't going to lose 100 lbs and 2 feet off their height to be the same weight and stature as a 12 year old.
Bây giờ hãy lấy đồ hơn nữa. Giả sử mọi người đều có tầm vóc như nhau, mặc quần áo giống nhau, đi cùng một con đường. Bạn vẫn có thể bị theo dõi và nhận dạng nếu ai đó có thể theo dõi bạn mà không bị gián đoạn. Even if you are of identical frame, wearing identical clothes, identical height, the whole shebang, if I can just watch you uninterrupted from the moment you leave home to the moment you get back at night, I can still surveil and associate every activity you engage in to you. Even if I don't know what your legal name is.
No meaningful privacy can actually be obtained without either preventing entirely the ability to surveil you (not practical at all) or finding blind spots where you can "mix" yourself with other people and obscure who is exiting those blind spots in which direction. Without these places multiple people can go into, where they cannot be surveilled inside, and leave in different orders and exits obscuring who is who, no privacy can be obtained from surveillance. Preventing surveillance in the wider world is essentially impossible, but if you can prevent it just in blind spots people can use for this purpose, that is enough.
This is all exactly how Bitcoin privacy works. Your UTXOs are you, people can see where they were, where they're going, deduce what you are doing with them, and compile a picture of all of this. Coinjoins, coinswaps, even centralized mixers in the imaginary ideal world where they were trustworthy (they aren't), function as those blind spots. Without the possibility of mixers, all of your activity is laid out bare for everyone to surveil on-chain, and without blind spots to go scramble your movement inside of for those watching, it's all taggable and trackable.
Bây giờ trước khi chúng ta đi sâu vào bất cứ điều gì ngoài sự tương tự, hãy xem xét mọi thứ qua lăng kính tương tự. Hãy nghĩ về tất cả những thay đổi phức tạp trong hành vi của bạn, trang phục bạn mặc, cách bạn di chuyển từ A đến B, bạn phải tăng thời gian di chuyển như thế nào để có thể đến điểm mù đồng bộ với đủ số người khác, tất cả sự phức tạp đó bạn phải quản lý và tham gia một cách có ý thức.
That is how complex privacy on Bitcoin is right now. That is the lengths people have to go to in order to achieve it, and the level of privacy gained is only proportional to how many other people go to those lengths. That is not a viable solution. Especially when you consider the possibility of the surveilers simply standing outside the blindspots and grabbing people going in and coming out, demanding details of where they went and what they did to reduce the amount of uncertainty of what other people are doing before and after entering.
Mối đe dọa của điểm mù Checkpoint
The equivalent of those blindspot checkpoints on Bitcoin is your exchanges, your regulated and KYC businesses, that demand explanations and information whenever they see you mix your coins after withdrawing or before depositing. The more people using coinjoins, or mixers, or any technique to function as a blindspot who interact with such services or entities and wind up divulging information end up doing harm to the overall privacy of others using those blindspots. The more people using blindspots to hide their activity who then go on to tell authorities exactly what they did, the less ambiguity there is for those who don't divulge that information.
Imagine the most extreme case of that, there is only a single person in a crowd of thousands of people who is not just divulging everything they are doing to authorities. That person has no privacy at all. With a full account of what every other person is doing, they de facto know everything the one person not giving that information to them is doing. That is the cat and mouse game of privacy on Bitcoin.
It is a very tough game to play, for many reasons. One problem is people actually acquiring Bitcoin. There are options to get Bitcoin without interacting with KYC systems directly, bisq, Azteco, người máy, ATMs requiring minimal information, even the possibility to meet directly in person through networks like local meetups. All of these solutions though generally come at a cost premium. The reason for that is most of the Bitcoin available for sale is on KYC exchanges. Centralized solutions to things just point blank have more efficiency most of the time, and that is especially true when it comes to things like order matching and price discovery.
This is ultimately a problem that must continue to be iterated on, like projects such as CivKit are doing. To pull all of those Bitcoin away from centralized KYC exchanges, better solutions must be built that offer a value add that those exchanges cannot in fulfilling the role of order matching and price discovery. If we want to get that Bitcoin away from places that tag it so it can be tracked, then we must outcompete those places in the role they fulfill. Otherwise, the damage to privacy done there can ripple out to people who avoid directly engaging with those services. That avoidance is not guaranteed to be enough.
Someone buying bitcoin KYC-free might think they are safe, but the reality of most bitcoin being on KYC exchanges means there is some trail from there. In all likelihood the person you are buying from bought it from such an exchange, and is KYCed. Those coins flowing out from him regularly represent a quasi-blindspot, and when the authorities show up and demand information they will get whatever they can. Did you contact this person by phone? A social media service that can be subpoenaed? That you identified yourself to? Now the person who thought they are beyond surveillance is surveilled.
This does significantly raise the cost for acquiring that information versus just directly querying exchanges, it doesn't make it impossible, but it makes it more time consuming. And that is the point. They are going to surveil the blindspots, they are going to try and extract information from everyone who uses them. So they need to be absolutely everywhere. From every A to every B. There need to be so many of them it is impossible to surveil them all, to extract information from any sizable number of people using them. Bitcoin needs to be pulled away from KYC sources so that most of the liquidity never interacts with it anymore, instead of bouncing from blindspot to exchange back and forth never creating any real distance.
That starts with outcompeting them as a place to coordinate exchanging bitcoin, but it's not enough alone. Those blindspots need to not only be almost omnipresent, they need to be convenient, intuitive, not prohibitively expensive. They need to be sustainable. They need to be all of these things so that people's behavior actually can shift en masse to regularly using them.
Hành vi và Công nghệ
Why do so many people use things like Twitter? Because it's intuitive and simple. There is no laborious process to interact with it, or high mental overhead for figuring out how to use it. Button, type, button. Function accomplished. The same thing with Amazon, or Netflix. No getting in the car and going to the store, walking around looking for specific things, just a few minutes maybe of scrolling and a button press and what you wanted to accomplish is accomplished.
That is how technology really alters behavior at a massive scale, by making it intuitive and easy to use. Look at how all those examples did so globally in the span of a decade in each case. They all altered the entire fabric of the market they entered, and totally altered the nature of how users interacted with those markets, and the behavior they engaged in within them. That is what must be done with software for Bitcoin whose goal is to create these blindspots.
Làm Bitcoin Privacy Intuitive
On the side of actually outcompeting centralized exchanges, the problem fundamentally comes down to the issues of order matching and reputation. In other words, a communications channel and bond scheme. A way to prove that you are not a sybil entity spamming the network, and a way to communicate offers to exchange things with each other. These two pieces together form the framework to have an actually decentralized way to price Bitcoin. A bond as a basis for identity in that framework would give a way for entities to attest to past interactions and their outcomes, and for that to be publicly verifiable in sorting through the potential offers being broadcast. Adding escrow and enforceability to bad behavior is as simple as multisig and fidelity bonds, DLCs, or other smart contracts.
Chúng tôi có tất cả các phần cần thiết cho các công cụ đơn giản và trực quan để thực hiện việc này một cách dễ dàng, chúng chỉ cần được ghép lại với nhau. Chúng phải được tiếp thị và mọi người biết đến chúng. Chúng tôi cần nhiều hơn trong số họ. Một hệ sinh thái bền vững và có thể mở rộng trong số đó có thể tiếp tục phát triển trong tương lai, đặc biệt là dưới áp lực bên ngoài.
It's a very similar thing regarding transacting in a private way. Tools like Ví Samourai, Wasabivà Ví thủy ngân, all exist right now. Lightning exists right now, though with many shortcomings in terms of user privacy. The nice thing there though, is we understand how to solve most of those shortcomings. It will just take the time and effort to glue them all together, and package them in an intuitive way.
Nếu chúng ta quay trở lại với phép tương tự, nếu không làm gì là đi bộ xung quanh ngoài trời được giám sát suốt thời gian, những thứ như coinjoins sẽ có những túp lều thông thường trên mỗi dãy nhà mà bạn đi qua cùng một nhóm người và ẩn mình ở cuối mỗi dãy nhà ; Sét giống như một hệ thống đường hầm có trạm kiểm soát ở đầu nơi bạn đăng ký ở lối vào nơi bạn bắt đầu, công khai tháo mặt nạ ra (nhưng chỉ ở lối vào bắt đầu) và lặp lại khi bạn quay lại điểm đó. Kết hợp hai thứ này lại với nhau và khắc phục các vấn đề ở phía Lightning, chúng ta có được một hệ thống đường hầm không có giám sát nội bộ, không có trạm kiểm soát ở bất kỳ lối vào nào và lối vào ở mọi góc phố.
Chúng tôi có các công cụ bảo mật trên chuỗi và chúng tôi bắt đầu có các công cụ bảo mật ngoài chuỗi với Lightning. Khắc phục những thiếu sót của Lightning, chúng tôi có một cách rẻ tiền và có thể mở rộng để giao dịch ngoài chuỗi mà không làm rò rỉ thông tin về các khoản thanh toán riêng lẻ. Với coinjoin hiện nay, chúng tôi có cách che khuất kết nối giữa các UTXO riêng lẻ trên chuỗi. Kết hợp cả hai điều đó lại với nhau một cách hợp lý, điều mà hiện chưa được thực hiện, bạn có các khoản thanh toán ngoài chuỗi riêng tư và có thể mở rộng với công cụ để che giấu ai đã tài trợ cho kênh nào. Bạn có một hệ thống đường hầm hoàn toàn riêng tư bên trong, không cách nào xác định được ai đang ra vào đâu.
Doesn't that sound much simpler than identifying yourself at an entrance after a walk through numerous blindspot huts to prevent people following you from home to there or vice versa? What if you had an entrance to the tunnel system in your home? None of that is going to happen without wider collaboration, without combining the individual pieces. The tools available now are better than nothing, but it is still not sustainable or intuitive enough at all to really gain any wide meaningful use. They're not comprehensive enough in looking at the whole picture and packaging it in an intuitive and yet comprehensible way.
The reality is most coins are still on or cycling through KYC exchanges, most coins are not using existing privacy tools. The reality is the successful grabs by authorities at large troves of identifiable information to tag and track people are becoming more frequent. This is what most of the simplest tools encourage. Activism and tribalistic elitism and bickering isn't going to change that, long-term sustainable solutions that are simple and accessible enough that people will use them will.
This is too important to screw up, and it's not something we have all the time in the world to solve. The form technology takes informs the behavior it creates, and right now most of the technological tooling for interacting with Bitcoin is encouraging behavior that fundamentally undermines privacy. That is ultimately what this entire issue is about. Behavior. Privacy is simply not achievable alone, it requires numbers. Yet it also requires a very large change in behavior, and for a large number of people to engage in that change. Bad behavior is entrenched right now.
Cách duy nhất để thay đổi hành vi xấu đó là sử dụng công cụ củng cố quyền riêng tư điều đó thật trực quan, đơn giản và bền vững. Bickering tribally won't make tools.
Nguồn chính thức: Bitcoin Tạp chí