By Bitcoin Tydskrif - 5 maande gelede - Leestyd: 22 minute
Word mynpoele 'n probleem?
Bitcoin miners provide a valuable service to the ecosystem. In exchange for the work they do securing the network, they are rewarded by the same network they protect. This sound and elegant design by Satoshi is surely one of the most remarkable aspects of Bitcoin.
Wat egter al hoe meer vergeet word, is dat daar meer aan mynbou is as bloot hashing.
A person engaging in the entire process must run a node to get reliably updated on the most recent state of the blockchain, then begin construction of a new block. This involves verifying the validity of the previous block, discovering unconfirmed transactions and usually selecting the most lucrative of them, constructing a generation transaction in which they pay themselves, building multiple merkle trees of these transactions, and finally hashing to actually solve this block. The transactions within the block template will constantly change as new ones get broadcasted to the network and when a new block is found by someone else, the miner must switch to building on top of that along with dumping all the transactions now already in the blockchain to populate a new template.
Vurk aktiverings
As you can see, hashing to actually solve the block is just one part of this process. A Bitcoin mining ASIC is also only capable of hashing. In the current environment, all other aspects of mining are generally delegated to mining pools. This has spawned some confusion. For example, in any circumstance where there is a discussion about activation of soft forks via version bit flipping within block templates, people will refer to this process being a MASF – “Miner Activated Soft Fork'' – and someone will always have to clarify that this responsibility falls solely to pools and that pools are not miners. They may also point out that miners are still ultimately in charge as if they desire the upgrade and the pool they are mining with doesn’t, they can simply switch pools. [For clarity, in the rest of this article I will refer to those only participating in hashing and leaving all other aspects of mining to pools as “hashers”.]
Back to soft forks - in the current environment where >99% of blocks are constructed by the same dozen entities, it becomes more accurate to call these “Pool Activated Soft Forks” which no one does, contributing to a dangerous illusion: that mining can be considered decentralized merely due to distribution of hashrate. This claim is simply not credible when all the hashrate is beholden to a tiny group of pools and thus the contents of Bitcoin’s blockchain going forward ultimately will not include anything these few entities consider unacceptable, as well as a whole host of other issues.
By not engaging in any other aspect of mining beyond hashing blocks constructed by pools, Bitcoin miners have largely abdicated a critical component of their role. The fact that this is not only possible but also the path of least resistance indicates that we have a systemic issue.
Swembaddens En Blockspace Markte
The implications of merely hashing and having a pool do everything else stretch far beyond soft fork activation. For example, miners presently are entirely unaware of what blocks will look like once solved, meaning that a miner performs work while blindly trusting that the block contains only desirable transactions. But you have a blatant violation of that trust in blocks such as hierdie een – this is the famous block that kicked off the “ordinals” craze. Notice how the transaction fees the miners who worked on this block would actually enjoy amount to a measly ~$200 in BTC, in contrast to the blocks either side of it both averaging ~$5,000 in BTC.
Block space is valuable – that’s part of what makes Bitcoin work in the long term – but in a world where just a handful of players can have a template they construct end up in the blockchain, those same entities have near-exclusivity to sell this space and be paid out of band in exchange for it. Are they obligated – or even likely – to be forthright with their miners that they are doing this? Certainly not in this case as the intention was to surprise everyone. Going forward will they forward on to their hashers payments they receive for selling blockspace out of band?
Simply put, while the incentives for a pool and its hashers typically align with regard to maximizing profit, a pool has the option of selling blockspace for things other than regular Bitcoin transactions, while a miner’s income is more limited unless the pool chooses to be transparent and agrees to share revenue. Even if they do, verification requires the pool’s permission as opposed to verifying money earned from subsidy and transaction fees (also tricky with FPPS pools, more on that later).
Further implications of pools being Bitcoin’s centralized constructors of block templates stem from the fact that - on a more fundamental level, there are twelve “super nodes” with their own “super mempools”.
This cascades into people dealing directly with pools and ignoring mempools altogether. Some contend that the mempool is doomed regardless - and that the current state of centralized template construction is merely accelerating this, but it’s certainly not desirable in any case and it would be overly pessimistic to make this assumption in a world where genuinely decentralized template construction is somehow made realistic. Then out-of-band payments must make their way to a larger group of people if whoever is purchasing the block space wishes to make it into the chain in the same time frame. This would likely be more transparent and reminiscent of the way things currently work. Conversely, “super nodes” would hopefully be broken up into smaller pieces and thus no longer be able to offer the same guarantees.
Om van hierdie aspek van mynbou af te wyk, laat ons fokus verskuif na hoe uitbetalings tans hanteer word.
Pool Uitbetaling Modelle
Nearly all pools pay their hashers via FPPS (Full Pay Per Share) or something similar. One exception is ViaBTC offers PPLNS (Pay Per Last N Shares) in addition to FPPS. Antpool also offers PPLNS but hashers must forfeit all transaction fee revenue - this speaks to the point that I will soon endeavor to make - essentially that FPPS is not a model that works well in a world where transaction fee revenue is what is of relevance rather than subsidy. It should be mentioned that Braiins pool (formerly Slushpool) uses a system referred to as “score” which in practice is quite similar to PPLNS.
Wat is die rede vir hierdie oorweldigende voorkeur vir FPPS? Vanuit die hasher se perspektief word hulle betaal, ongeag wat op die blokketting gebeur. Dit stem ooreen met die doel van saamgevoegde mynbou – groter konsekwentheid van inkomste. FPPS bied meer konsekwente uitbetalings omdat die poel betaal op grond van geprojekteerde inkomste en onafhanklik met die blockchain afreken.
Dit maak die lewe uiters maklik vir mynwerkers wat probleme as gevolg van kontantvloei-ontwrigting wil verminder, maar daar is natuurlik nadele – groots wat ek hoop om hier uit te lig.
FPPS first and foremost requires that the pool become the custodian of all freshly mined bitcoins. These cannot be forwarded on to miners for a minimum of 100 blocks as freshly mined bitcoins are unspendable until after this and in practice, the mined coins can have nothing to do with what the miners are ultimately receiving when making withdrawals from the pool. The risks of third party custody should be obvious to almost everyone reading this article so I’ll skip it and move on to other issues with FPPS.
Die volgende bekommernis kom uit die feit dat 'n FPPS-poel meer algemeen 'n belangrike tussenganger is tussen hashers en die netwerk self. Ons het reeds vasgestel dat hashers nie ingelig is oor hoe die blokke waaraan hulle werk uiteindelik sal lyk totdat hulle opgelos is nie. FPPS beteken dat hulle nou ook nie bekommerd is oor of blokke selfs gevind word of nie, dis die swembad se probleem. As ons die verhoogde voorspelbaarheid van uitbetalings ignoreer (sou 'n swembad nooit besluit om sy hashers te beklee nie), moet ons die afwykings erken om dit te doen.
Miners getting paid directly by Bitcoin itself – possible in alternative schemes like PPLNS or of course solo mining – can expect to be fully rewarded for their contributions including transaction fees. An FPPS pool can only do this as a post-hoc calculation because there is simply no way to predict what fees will amount to when establishing what hashers actually receive per share. A pool cannot simply assume that fees will be some value greater than 0 and credit miners with this as they mine because should fees drop below this value, they would simply be paying the miners out of their own pocket. They must periodically divide up fees and attribute them to miners once actually in the pool’s custody.
From the hasher’s perspective, complete trust in the pool is required since verification is next to impossible without the pool’s full transparency and cooperation. Previously, as alluded to above, this was less of an issue since most mining revenue came from subsidy with only a sprinkling of sats in transaction fees – but this increasingly isn’t (and indeed cannot be) the future of Bitcoin mining. Going forward, miners will earn primarily from transaction fees and those are simply harder to predict and monitor when using a pool than the subsidy.
Contrasted with a payout scheme like PPLNS where hashers accept increased variability (the pool’s luck becomes the hasher’s luck too), we see that the mining ecosystem has overwhelmingly elected to prioritize consistency of payouts over the ability to verify what is received. More perversely, some hashers actually prefer this — wishing to present themselves to governmental authorities as a kind of “hashing service” entirely disconnected from Bitcoin–some proudly so. This is because FPPS is such a radical deviation from the ideal miner/pool dynamic that it’s once again hard to describe what the hasher is even doing as “bitcoin mining”.
In effect, the FPPS pool is a large solo miner paying hashers to solve its blocks. After which they have an internal and opaque process by which they figure out what to pay their hashers. To really illustrate the point the hasher could (and in some not-so-hard to imagine scenarios would) even be paid its fees in something other than Bitcoin.
Why not? If you don’t care if any blocks get found let alone what they look like before construction, why not just get paid fiat by a solo miner to point your ASICs at them in whatever the most convenient currency is? Bitcoin is not always the most frictionless option, but even if it were, it’s reasonable to imagine continuing down a path where “hashing” may be performed by as many entities as you like, but all done on behalf of a tiny group of “pools” whose permission the entire network needs to get anything into the actual blockchain.
Wie Hashing in elk geval?
Let’s look at this in a wider context. We have already mentioned that some larger players wish to distance themselves from Bitcoin as far as possible, thus happily delegating as much Bitcoin related activity to their pool as possible. The pools are wide open to regulation, and a large amount of their hashrate is only too happy about it.
Dit stel weer ekonomiese irrasionaliteit vanuit die perspektief van die netwerk self bekend, wat manifesteer in gedrag soos die ontginning van blokke wat aan sekere arbitrêre standaarde voldoen. Toe dit in die verlede gebeur het, het dit nie lank geduur nie as gevolg van terugslag van die gemeenskap, en die absurditeit om aggressief 'n jurisdiksie se veranderende reguleringskema te probeer paai sonder om eers gevra te word om dit te doen. Maar die feit dat dit 'n opsie was, verraai die risiko om gesentraliseerde konstruksie van bloksjablone te hê. Sal mynwerkers in een jurisdiksie probeer om transaksies wat uit 'n ander spruit, te verbied of te weier om te verwerk? Sal mynwerkers bloot 'n verlengstuk van 'n regering of invloedryke slegte akteur wees? Daar is konkrete voorbeelde van poele wat transaksiefooie verlaag het om buite bande te trek, soms bloot om aan regulatoriese druk te voldoen. Dit kom weer eens ekonomies irrasioneel voor vanuit die perspektief van die netwerk.
The most extreme recent example of this was the 19 BTC transaction fee paid in a transaction in a block ultimately found by F2Pool, ostensibly in error. As a FPPS pool, they became the custodian of the 19 BTC mining fee and chose to give it back to the person who made the mistake. This demonstrates perfectly the price of placing too large an intermediary between your miner and the Bitcoin network. In a PPLNS pool this would be less likely to have happened. Not because PPLNS pools are necessarily trustless or non-custodial, but by virtue of it being possible to monitor and verify fee revenue at the exact moment blocks come in, this would possibly have been harder for the pool to attempt having likely already credited miner’s accounts internally with their share of the mined funds causing greater backlash. Although nothing is in principle different until you contrast what would have happened should a pool make payouts to its miners in the coinbase/generation transaction itself. In that scenario the money would have already been in the miner’s custody and interception of fee revenue by the pool would have been impossible. So in this example a pool’s desire to seem generous or fair cost its miners $500,000 in fee revenue making a decision on behalf of them it should not have been in a position to make.
Volgende uitgawe: 51% en ander aanvalle
Dit behoort eenvoudig te wees om te verduidelik: op hierdie stadium weet almal wat 'n 51%-aanval is. Wat egter baie minder verstaan word, is dat (totdat die netwerk roetes daaromheen) 51% die vereiste is dat hierdie styl van aanval 'n gewaarborgde en ewigdurende sukses moet wees eerder as bloot ontwrigtend.
In werklikheid kan enige entiteit wat meer as 20% van die netwerk het, probleme veroorsaak deur 'n menigte aanvalle, sommige word in die natuur uitgevoer en slegs selde bespreek, wat ek later sal bespreek. Maar voordat ons dit doen, kan ons verstom staar na die netwerk wat 'n jammerlike twee entiteite het met 'n gekombineerde hashrate betroubaar groter as 51%. Erger nog, een van die grootste poele verdoesel nie so versigtig dat dit verantwoordelik is vir nog 10% van die blokke wat gevind word deur nog 'n groot poel met wie die moedermaatskappy 'n strategiese vennootskap handhaaf nie. Die feit dat hierdie pantomime voortduur, wek nie vertroue nie.
There are two usual responses to this. Firstly, people point out that hashers can simply vote with their feet and switch pools if they ever combined forces to 51% attack. Secondly, that any pool would be insane to attempt it for the simple reason that disrupting bitcoin would cause the price to fall and no one invested in the ecosystem would ever want that. The second argument ignores human history and further assumes that people can never be coerced into behaving destructively and thus causing disruption simply for disruption’s sake or other nefarious purposes. (It also doesn’t take into account the fact that the market is often not necessarily a good indicator that there are issues with Bitcoin, see the forkwars of 2017.)
Die eerste argument maak egter 'n meer soliede aanname dat hashers altyd sal oorskakel in 'n scenario waar een poel inderdaad te groot word. Inderdaad, as poele probeer om hierdie te doen, sou die werklikheid inskop en ons sou besef dat poele nie eintlik mynwerkers is nie, ondanks die bou van 99% van ons bloksjablone. Ons het ook 'n gevallestudie van Ghash.io wat beroemd is doodspiraal nadat almal geskrik het met meer as 40%.
Groot, so ons het getoon dat dit nie regtig 'n probleem is nie, daar kan op hashers staatgemaak word om net na 'n ander swembad te spring. (In werklikheid, as groot mynbedrywighede alles in rompslomp vasgevang is, is dit 'n veel minder betroubare aanname, maar laat ons ten minste voortgaan asof ons redelik vol vertroue is dat hierdie aanval nie waarskynlik is nie.)
Unfortunately, awareness of the fact that hash power will migrate away from any pool that exceeds a scary threshold leads to them self-regulating - but not in a way that helps because they do not need to genuinely maintain a hashrate below a threshold, they simply need to make it verskyn daardie manier. Dit kom in wese neer op die aanvaarding van al die hash-krag wat hulle kan kry terwyl hulle dit aanstuur na ander poele soos nodig om te verhoed dat die wêreld gewaarsku word oor hul vermoë om verwoesting te saai.
So this leaves us with an unknowable picture of the network. 30% of blocks can be overtly found by the largest pool and be acceptable to everyone, while a further 10% of total network hashrate is still pointed at that pool and just secretly being directed to one or multiple smaller pools. The hashers responsible for that 10% are unlikely to realize it’s being used this way (and it gets even harder to detect with stratumV2 - more on this later).
Hierdie reeds minder as ideale scenario word veel erger as jy die feit in ag neem dat hierdie herlei hashrate gebruik kan word om kleiner poele te benadeel via die blokweerhoudingsaanval.
This is as follows - the attacker engages in the mining process mostly as a normal user of the victim pool. As a result, they get a share of the reward from any block the pool finds as expected. The rewards then ultimately end up with the attacker who can then pay the actual hasher without having to lose any money. So far the only harm caused is the incorrect impression of the pool’s hashrate as being smaller than it actually is but the smaller pool remains unharmed.
Now the harm occurs if they decide to not tell the victim pool when they find a block. This has the effect of making the victim pool appear unlucky. They appear to simply be finding fewer blocks than they should be and are paying out a reward split among more participants than are actually honestly mining - i.e necessarily running at a loss assuming they don’t make up the losses some other way.
As 'n FPPS-poel op hierdie manier aangeval word, moet hulle inkomste wat mynwerkers betaal, uit die sak verbrand om die verskil te vergoed. As hulle PPLNS is, wonder hul mynwerkers hoekom hulle nie kry wat hulle veronderstel is om te kry nie. Hoe dit ook al sy, blokweerhouding is mededingend en kan die slagofferpoel vernietig deur dit 'n slegte reputasie te gee.
Vanuit die aanvallende poel se perspektief, kom ons sê hulle maak 5% van die slagofferpoel se hashrate uit. Dit beteken hulle maak steeds 95% van die verwagte inkomste en die swembad lyk 5% minder gelukkig as wat verwag is. Dit is maklik genoeg om die swembad dood te maak, terwyl die verlies van 5% op die herlei hashrate van veel minder betekenis vir die groter swembad sal wees. As dit slegs 1% van die groter poel se totale hash-krag verteenwoordig, verloor die aanvaller net 5% van 1% van sy verwagte belonings – 0.05%. Dit is 'n geen-brainer-voordeel vir enige kwaadwillige mynpoel van aansienlike grootte wat net bereid is om oneties op te tree.
The smaller the pool, the more vulnerable they are to this attack. The larger the pool, the more likely they are to block withhold a competing, smaller pool. This risk increases as large pools approach levels where their total hashrate begins to scare the community, which further motivates them to at least stash hashrate in smaller pools, even if they don’t actually attack with it or execute attacks infrequently enough for the problems to ultimately get dismissed as variance. Indeed - decreased variability is already enjoyed by larger pools due to more consistent payouts from the network which translates into being able to operate within tighter margins and thus be in a position to charge their hashers less. From the perspective of every miner/pool that isn’t under attack this attack means that they will enjoy lower difficulty as the Bitcoin network adjusts for there being fewer overall blocks.
Is block withholding merely theoretical? Absolutely not. Several mining pools were attacked in this exact way even as early as 2015. It is extremely difficult to thwart as a pool must monitor all workers and make a calculated decision to kick them off the pool and/or withhold payments to them should they be unlucky to a point of statistical impossibility and the pool able to reasonably assume they are acting maliciously. Attacks of this nature also incentivize pools to want to “know their hasher'' and custody payments which of course makes life harder for those wishing to mine permissionlessly.
Ongeag, die algehele effek van dit alles is dat mense om nog 'n ander rede mynbou met groter poele sal verkies.
Ons het in die openbaar verklarings van groot mynwerkers gesien wat verklaar dat hulle wegskakel van kleiner poele as gevolg van betalings wat nie aan verwagtinge voldoen het nie.
This is extremely undesirable as larger pools and the larger hashers that use them are more easily encumbered with regulatory burden and thus prone to engaging in behavior that damages Bitcoin, going beyond even centralization of block templates and temporary custodianship of all block rewards.
Die poele word effektief afgevaardig, en dwing burokratiese nonsens af namens hul hashers. Die twee grootste swembaddens vereis tans dat hul gebruikers deur 'n ton hoepels spring, insluitend identiteitsblootstellingsprosesse that should not and must not become necessary for someone to be able to mine bitcoin outside of solo mining.
To make one final point on block withholding beyond it threatening to make life harder for smaller pools and anyone wishing to hash with them, I say to anyone who might still be tempted to dismiss it as purely theoretical (even though its demonstrably happened in the past) - do we think it’s normal for pools to remain a consistent and apparently tolerable size organically? This would imply new hashrate coming online always somehow managing to distribute itself at least somewhat evenly. We must believe a pool can spring into existence, grow prodigiously and then just….stop….at right around the threshold needed before people get spooked. Do we see pools begging people to stop mining with them or straight up limiting account creation and kicking miners offline that exceed a permitted hashrate within existing accounts? We of course do not.
The two more probable scenarios are that either hashers are collectively self-regulating (unlikely, as mining with smaller pools now famously means earning less bitcoin even if the reasons I’ve presented in this article don’t entirely account for why - not to mention that examples of mass exodus from a pool were extremely noticeable the few times they have happened) - or - pools are simply misrepresenting the amount of hashrate they have pointed at them.
Om dit alles by te voeg, het kleiner poele nog 'n probleem: hulle kan dae verbygaan sonder om blokke te vind. 'n Groter swembad sal nie langer as 'n paar uur duur nie. Dit is 'n kwessie van resolusie – hoe hoër jou hashrate, hoe nader is jy aan verwagtinge oor die kort termyn, en dit lei ongelukkig tot 'n minimum drempel waaronder 'n poel nie kan verwag om op te maak vir periodes van slegte geluk op watter stadium dit net onmoontlik word om mee te ding.
The two-week periods between difficulty epochs means a reasonable number of blocks must be found within that two-week period so that any bad luck has a shot at being balanced out by subsequent good luck. If not, if - for example - the pool has a projected block rate of 1 block every 13 days and doesn’t find a block before the difficulty adjusts upwards causing them to drop to a projection of 1 in every 15 days, that prior window has closed forever. If it’s a PPLNS pool, the hashers have earned less than they otherwise might have. If it’s an FPPS pool, the pool has burnt a lot of cash and/or become bankrupt.
This means there are only so many pools that can exist, at least ones that operate the way today’s pools operate. There simply cannot be hundreds, because many of them would keep collapsing in periods of bad luck due to having less than 1% of the network hashrate and therefore potentially not even being able to reliably find one block per day, encountering potential periods of weeks without blocks. This is a limitation placed on us by Bitcoin self.
Hoe kommunikeer mynwerkers en swembaddens?
The protocol by which miners and pools communicate is Stratum (slowly but surely being superseded by StratumV2). StratumV1 is both ancient and deeply flawed. Firstly, all communication is done in plaintext. This means ISPs are not only privy to the fact that you’re mining but also the scale to which you are doing so, and they - along with anyone else that can snoop traffic on your network - can perform MITM attacks resulting in you using your machines and power on someone else’s behalf. This has been abused before by unknown attackers to hijack hashrate away from the intended pools.
Afgesien van 'n aantal ondoeltreffendheid, slaag StratumV1 ook nie daarin om mynwerkers 'n praktiese manier te bied om hul eie bloksjablone te bou en steeds te geniet om in 'n swembad te ontgin nie. Al hierdie kwessies word aangespreek met die uiters wenslike StratumV2 (oorspronklik “GBT”, dan “Better Hash”) waarna ons later sal terugkeer.
Hardeware/Fermware
Before getting to the solutions, we’ll deviate from discussing pool/miner dynamics - as this article would be incomplete if we failed to bring up the fact that there are only two companies manufacturing ASICs at any meaningful scale - Bitmain and MicroBT. There are others, but realistically almost all hashing is occurring on machines manufactured by those two companies.
Dit is om ooglopende redes nie goed nie en spruit in wese uit die feit dat chipvervaardiging uiters moeilik is om te doen en dus hipersentraliseer.
It’s outside the scope of this article to go into solutions here, but there are folks working on making home mining something far more practical (in North America the main issue being the requirement for 220-240v and dealing with the obnoxious noise). The contention among those working on these pleb-mining projects being that if it becomes doable for enough every-day bitcoin, they can start to represent a significant percentage of the total hashrate of the network, which is preferable to most mining operations operating at a scale where they are wide open to regulatory interference.
Hierdie taak word baie moeiliker gemaak deur die feit dat die firmware geslote bron is. Selfs pasgemaakte firmware wat 'n ASIC kan "jailbreak" is geneig om geslote bron te wees om te verseker dat diegene wat dit gebruik, ontwikkelingsfooie betaal (d.w.s. die koste vir jou ongelooflike namark-firmware word ontgin namens die span wat die firmware vervaardig.)
The stock firmware on ASICs - particularly Bitmain’s - is a great indication of how comfortable they have become with their dominance of the market. Beyond being closed source, it’s clearly malicious. You are forced to mine on their behalf upon powering up an Antminer – though a miner can at least prevent this from happening by blocking the connection (or installing aftermarket firmware, but then you pay dev fees instead and those can’t be blocked without the miner refusing to mine at all.) Bitmain has also been caught several times adding malicious backdoors to the firmware for their miners (see Antbleed), and actively works to lock out aftermarket firmware developers.
Die feit dat voorraadfirmware dit doen, is eerlikwaar verregaande en beklemtoon duidelik die dringende behoefte aan mededinging in ASIC-vervaardiging.
Would anyone feel comfortable if the rules of the network were enforced by closed source bitcoin nodes? Further, imagine those nodes caused users to lose BTC to the developers of that software - and we all knew that was happening. Would anyone accept that? When it comes to mining, almost no regard is paid to the sovereignty of its participants. Of course node software and ASIC firmware are not of equivalent importance and we of course place more scrutiny on the former as we should, but the latter is not immaterial and is certainly being unacceptably neglected.
Met alles wat gesê is, kom ons gaan voort na sommige van die oplossings, en fokus veral op die uitbreiding van die omvang van wat moontlik is as 'n mynwerker en die verbetering van bestaande modelle.
P2 Pool
There is not much to say on this beside the fact that it decentralized basically every aspect of pooled mining. While this does many desirable things at a small scale, it requires that every user download, verify, and track the shares of every other user and prove to each other that they are accounting for everything correctly in their templates. Achieving this in an adversarial environment at any scale is essentially an impossible task. Due to the fundamental nature of pooled mining, far more resources are required than what is needed to run a Bitcoin full node, not to mention making things more complicated for the miner.
For these reasons it has been ignored by most, and used only by more technical users or idealists who - understandably - cannot bring themselves to mine with the alternatives.
StratumV2
Dit is beslis die vrug wat die laagste hang. Dit bied praktiese oplossings vir baie van die kwessies wat in hierdie artikel genoem word.
Eerstens, deur geënkripteerde kommunikasie tussen poele en hashers toe te laat, sal ISP's en enige ander entiteit met toegang tot jou netwerkverkeer nie meer onbenullig bewus word van die feit dat jy ontgin (of die mate waarin jy dit doen nie). "MITMing" om jou namens 'n aanvaller te hashing word gevolglik ook onmoontlik, of veel minder triviaal.
Secondly and perhaps most significantly, it’s also capable of allowing hashers to construct their own block templates, so while pools would remain trusted coordinators of reward splits, and likely still custodians of block rewards - this would nonetheless represent a shift in power away from pools towards miners and be unequivocally a good thing.
Lastly, there are a few other improvements that I encourage you to check out na hierdie skakel.
A world in which StratumV2 is the norm, along with enthusiasm from miners to actually construct their own templates (ideally a pool would offer an incentive to miners who did this) would enjoy a far more resilient Bitcoin.
Die gemeenskap is in wese verenig in die werk om die mynbou-ekosisteem na StratumV2 op te gradeer, maar histories het mynwerkers oor die algemeen die gebruik van hierdie oplossings vermy weens bykomende moeite (hoewel onbenullig in vergelyking met p2pool) en geen aansporing om dit te doen nie.
Afronding
There is great room for improvement with or without StratumV2. What’s needed is a pool that offers miners the ability to take direct custody of their coins while mining. This requires that a pool (or its hashers) construct block templates in which miner’s rewards are paid out directly in the coinbase/generation transaction contained within every block. The fact that this is impractical under the FPPS system means any pool doing this would face reluctance from some miners, but those who switched would enjoy greater transparency as Bitcoin itself would - above some threshold - be paying them directly with an easy to verify split of subsidy and fee revenue. This can be coupled with pools - pre-stratumV2 - at least making miners aware of block templates constructed on their behalf prior to blocks being solved, and post-stratumV2 simply needing to verify that all miners are constructing templates that accurately reflect reward splits without the scaling implications of all miners having to do this continuously.
The pool can also address the reluctance of miners to make their own block templates by offering incentives for miners who do so, by - for example - charging them lower fees. It seems that if miners are unwilling to take on the burden of doing this even once it becomes practical again, then this additional incentive might become necessary.
Bogenoemde voorstelle sal dinge dramaties verbeter.
Baie inisiatiewe en aankondigings kom met betrekking tot ASIC-vervaardiging en swembad-infrastruktuur wat hopelik welkome ontwikkelings sal wees vir almal wat belangstel om mynboutendense na groter desentralisasie te verseker.
Hierdie is 'n gaspos deur Bitcoin Mechanic. Menings wat uitgespreek word, is heeltemal hul eie en weerspieël nie noodwendig dié van BTC Inc of Bitcoin Magazine.
Oorspronklike bron: Bitcoin Tydskrif